Two protocols of quantum direct communication with authentication [Phys. Rev. A 73, 042305 (2006)] are recently proposed by Lee, Lim and Yang. In this paper we will show that in the two protocols the authenticator Trent should be prevented from knowing the secret message of communication. The first protocol can be eavesdropped by Trent using the the intercept-measure-resend attack, while the second protocol can be eavesdropped by Trent using single-qubit measurement. To fix these leaks, I revise the original versions of the protocols by using the Pauli-Z operation σ z instead of the original bit-flip operation X. As a consequence, the protocol securities are improved.
in the two protocols the authenticator Trent should be prevented from knowing the secret message of communication. The first protocol can be eavesdropped by Trent using the the intercept-measure-resend attack, while the second protocol can be eavesdropped by Trent using single-qubit measurement. I will fix these leaks by modifying the original versions of the protocols using that Pauli-Z operation σ z instead of the original bit-flip operation X so that the protocol securities are improved.
There are three parties in each of the Lee-Lim-Yang protocols. Alice and Bob are the legitimate users of the communication. Trent is the third party who is introduced to authenticate the two users participating in the communication. Trend is assumed to be more powerful than the other two parties and he supplies the GHZ states each in the form of |Ψ = (|000 + |111 )/ √ 2. The protocols are composed of two parts: one is for an authentication process and the other is for a direct communication. The authentication process is same for both Lee-Lim-Yang protocols. After the authentication, there are two possibilities for Alice to send qubits: one is to Bob and the other is to Trend. The former case corresponds to the Lee-Lim-Yang protocol 1 and the latter case to the Lee-Lim-Yang protocol 2. This is a difference between the two protocols. Incidentally, there is an unphysical mistake about the respondences in the text of Ref. [12] .
The purpose of the authentication process in the Lee-Lim-Yang protocols is to let the three participants safely share GHZ states. To achieve this goal, it is assumed that Trend should share in priori secret authentication keys K ta and K tb with Alice and Bob, respectively. The lengths of the authentication keys K ta and K tb are larger than the length of the bit string of the secret message which will be communicated from Alice to Bob. According to the one-time pad cryptography, when the private key length is equal to the secret message length, the secret message can be securely communicated to remote places after encryption. If Trend is not assumed to prevent from knowing the secret message, then in this case the secret message can be transferred in the following very simple classical way instead of using the Lee-Lim-Yang QSDC protocols, i.e, Alice can securely send the secret message to Trend by using their secret authentication key K ta and then Trend can securely send the secret message to Bob by using their secret authentication key K tb . Hence, in the Lee-Lim-Yang protocols the third party Trend should be prevented from knowing the secret message though he is introduced to authenticate the communication.
Assume that the GHZ states are safely shared among the three parties after the authentication process. Let us now briefly review the second part of the Lee-Lim-Yang protocol 1.
(a) Alice selects a subset of GHZ states of her remaining set after authentication and keeps it secret.
(b) Alice chooses a random bit string which has no correlation to the secret message to transmit to Bob. This bit string will be used to check the security of the channel.
(c) Following the random bit string, Alice performs unitary operations on the the qubits selected for check process. The unitary operations are defined as follows. The bit '0' correspond to H and the bit '1' to HX, where H is the Hadamard operation and X is the bit-flip operation. The GHZ states after Alice's operations are transformed into:
where (j) Bob can know whether the channel is disturbed according to the error rate. If the error rate is higher than expected, an eavesdropper is concluded in the communication but fortunately the secret message is not leaked out. If the error rate is lower, Bob can extract the secret message (see Table I in Ref. [12] ).
As I show before, the authenticator Trent should be prevented from the secret message. Otherwise, the communication can be realized in a very simple classical way. Although the Lee-Lim-Yang protocol 1 is claimed to be secure (that is, the secret message can not be leaked out), in the protocol 1 the insider Trent can eavesdrop the secret message by using the intercept-measure-resend attack. This can be seen as follows. When Alice sends her encoded qubits to Bob, Trent intercepts the qubits and performs H operation on each qubit. In this case, the whole states are transformed into
After the unitary operations, Trent measures Alice's qubit and his qubit in the z basis {|0 , |1 }, respectively. If the two outcomes are same, then Trent can conclude that Alice has performed a H operation corresponding to the bit '0'. Otherwise, Alice has performed a HX operation corresponding to the bit '1'. In this case, Trent has already known for each Alice's qubit which unitary operation Alice has performed on. Alternatively, he has already got Alice's whole bit string including both the random bit string for check and the secret message.
In the following what he needs to do is to remove the random bits. Fortunately, in the step (i), Alice will publish which qubits are used as check qubits. This means that the authenticator Trent can completely know the secret message using this intercept-measure-resend attack.
After Trnent's attack, he sends Alice's qubits to Bob. One can easily find that for Alice an Bob the error rate will obviously be higher than expected. Unfortunately, Alice and Bob only know the channel is disturbed and still believe that the secret message is not leaked out.
To fix this leak, we think the original version of Lee-Lim-Yang protocol 1 can be modified by using the Pauli-Z operation σ z instead of the original bit-flip operation X. In this case, the total states after Alice's operations are represented as follows:
After this modification, if Trend intercepts Alice's encoded qubits and performs H operations, then the total states are transformed into
If he measures respectively his qubit and Alice's qubit in the z basis, the outcomes will always be same. In this case, he can not know for each of Alice's qubits which unitary operation Alice has performed on. This means Trent can not know Alice's secret message. However, one can easily find that revised protocol works successfully as for as Alice and Bob's communication is concerned. See Table 1 for a brief summary. 
Let us now briefly review the second part of the Lee-Lim-Yang protocol 2. Some steps are same for both protocols. Nevertheless, for completeness, I depict all the steps as follows.
(a ′ ) Alice selects a subset of GHZ states of her remaining set after authentication and keeps it secret.
(b ′ ) Alice chooses a random bit string which has no correlation to the secret message to transmit to
Bob. This bit string will be used to check the security of the channel.
(c ′ ) Following the random bit string, Alice performs unitary operations on the the qubits selected for check process. The GHZ states after Alice's operations are transformed into: (j ′ ) Bob can know whether the channel is disturbed according to the error rate. If the error rate is higher than expected, an eavesdropper is concluded in the communication but fortunately the secret message is not leaked out. If the error rate is lower, Bob can extract the secret message (see Table II in Ref. [12] ). In the protocol 2 the insider Trent can eavesdrop the secret message by using the measurement attack as follows. Trent performs H operation on each qubit he received from Alice. In this case, the whole states are transformed into
After the unitary operations, Trent measures Alice's qubit and his qubit in the z basis {|0 , |1 }, respectively. If the two outcomes are same, then Trent can conclude that Alice has performed a H operation corresponding to the bit '0'. Otherwise, Alice has performed a HX operation corresponding to the bit '1'. In this case, Trent has already known for each Alice's qubit which unitary operation Alice has performed on. Alternatively, he has already got Alice's whole bit string including both the random bit string for check and the secret message. In the following what he needs to do is to remove the random bits. Fortunately, in the step (i'), Alice will publish which qubits are used as check qubits. This means that the authenticator Trent can completely know the secret message using this measurement attack. After Trnent's attack, he randomly publishes his measurement outcomes. One can easily find that for Alice an Bob the error rate will obviously be higher than expected. Unfortunately, Alice and Bob only know the channel is disturbed and still believe that the secret message is not leaked out.
To fix this leak, the original version of Lee-Lim-Yang protocol 2 can also be modified by using the Pauli-Z operation σ z instead of the original bit-flip operation X. In this case, the total states after Alice's operations are represented as follows:
If he measures respectively his qubit and Alice's qubit in the z basis, the outcomes will always be same.
In this case, he can not know for each of Alice's qubits which unitary operation Alice has performed on. This means Trent can not know Alice's secret message. However, one can easily find that revised protocol works successfully as for as Alice and Bob's communication is concerned. See Table 2 for a brief summary. To summarize, in this paper we have shown that the Lee-Lim-Yang protocols can be eavesdropped by the authenticator Trent using some specific attacks and we have revised the original versions of the protocols by using the Pauli-Z operation σ z instead of the original bit-flip operation X so that the protocol securities are improved.
